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CASE SUMMARY
UNITED STATES V. CANO:
THE NINTH CIRCUIT LIMITS
WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF
CELL PHONES AT THE BORDER
KATE CHRISTENSEN*
INTRODUCTION
In 1956, the first commercial hard drive could store 3.75 megabytes
of data between 50 disks.1 The operating system weighed over one ton.2
Today, Apple’s iPhone 11 Pro can store up to 512 gigabytes of data on a
device that weighs under seven ounces.3 This means that today an indi-
vidual can have approximately 140,000 times more data stored on a cell
phone in their pocket. With this storage capacity, cell phones can store
data containing your favorite songs, texts messages sent between friends,
and the call history between you and your grandmother. However, a cell
phone may contain more sensitive information, such as an electronic re-
cord of your location history, an e-book that indicates your political party
affiliation, or private photos sent between you and your significant other.
Individuals crossing the United States border with their cell phones,
likely containing both innocuous and sensitive data, may have their cell
phones searched by a United States Customs and Border Patrol officer or
* J.D. Candidate, Golden Gate University School of Law, May 2020; B.A. Spanish Language
and Literature, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, December 2016. The author would like to express
her gratitude the members of the Golden Gate University Law Review for their support and her
fiancé, Eric R. Bennion, for his encouragement and the many happy years they have shared together.
1 1956: First Commercial Hard Disk Drive Shipped, COMPUTER HISTORY MUSEUM (Sept. 19,
2018), https://www.computerhistory.org/storageengine/first-commercial-hard-disk-drive-shipped/.
2 Id.
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Homeland Security agent.4 In United States v. Cano, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that certain limitations apply to searches of cell
phones at the border.5 First, the search must be limited in scope; the
search must be conducted to discover digital contraband, not evidence of
a future crime.6 Second, if the search is forensic, meaning the search
greatly intrudes upon the privacy of an individual, the search is only




On July 25, 2016, Defendant-Appellant Miguel Angel Cano traveled
from Tijuana to the San Ysidro Port of Entry to cross the border between
the United States and Mexico.8 A United States Customs and Border
Patrol (CBP) officer conducted a routine primary inspection of Cano.9
Cano informed the officer that Cano lived in Mexico, worked in San
Diego, and intended to visit Los Angeles on that particular day.10 The
CBP computer system randomly selected Cano as a candidate for secon-
dary inspection.11 As part of the secondary inspection, a narcotics-de-
tecting dog alerted a CBP official to the spare tire located on the
undercarriage of Cano’s truck.12 The official removed the spare tire and
discovered 14 vacuum sealed packages collectively containing 14.03
kilograms of cocaine.13 Cano was arrested and Cano’s cell phone was
seized as an administrative procedure associated with the arrest.14
CBP officials notified Homeland Security of Cano’s arrest.15 Two
Homeland Security agents, Petonak and Medrano, were dispatched to the
scene.16 Petonak manually inspected the contents of Cano’s cell phone in
search of investigative leads pertinent to the current case and evidence
related to transportation of other materials across the border.17 Petonak
4 U.S. v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002, 1012 (9th Cir. 2019).
5 Id. at 1007.
6 Id. at 1013–14.
7 Id. at 1014–16 (9th Cir. 2019).
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noted that Cano’s cell phone contained a robust call log but no text
messages.18
Petonak interrogated Cano, who waived his Miranda right to stay
silent.19 Cano denied knowledge of the cocaine.20 Cano told Petonak that
he had moved from Los Angeles to Tijuana and crossed the border every
day for the past three weeks in search of work in San Diego.21 Cano
stated that, on this particular day, he crossed the border to obtain work
from a carpet store in Chula Vista.22 Petonak asked Cano the name and
address of the carpet store in Chula Vista, but Cano was unable to pro-
vide this information and claimed that he intended to search for the store
on Google after crossing the border.23 Cano explained that he did not
have flooring tools on his person or in his truck because his tools were
located in Los Angeles and he planned to retrieve them only after he was
successful in obtaining work in San Diego.24 Petonak questioned Cano
about the contents of his cell phone.25 Petonak asked why Cano did not
have text messages on his phone and Cano stated that, based on the ad-
vice of his cousin, he deleted all of his text messages to avoid potential
conflict with Mexican police.26
While Petonak questioned Cano, Medrano conducted a second man-
ual search of Cano’s cell phone.27 Medrano recorded some of the phone
numbers that appeared on Cano’s call log and took photographs of two
text messages that Cano received since arriving at the border.28 Medrano
then conducted a forensic examination of Cano’s cell phone.29 Medrano
used the computer software program, Cellebrite, which allows an indi-
vidual to search for and selectively download content from a cell
phone.30 The content can include text messages, contacts, call logs, me-
dia, and data related to applications installed on the cell phone.31 Cel-
lebrite does not access data stored within third-party applications.32













30 Id. at 1008-09.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 1009.
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rensic search to Petonak.33 Later, Petonak determined that Cano’s call
log did not contain records of phone calls to any carpet stores in San
Diego.34
B. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Cano was indicted for the importation of cocaine, a controlled sub-
stance.35 Before Cano’s initial trial, Cano asked the district court to sup-
press evidence obtained from the warrantless search of his cell phone
conducted by agents Petonak and Medrano at the United States-Mexico
border.36 The court denied Cano’s request, holding that both manual
searches and the forensic search were permissible border searches.37
For trial, Cano prepared a defense in which he implicated his cousin,
Jose Medina, by claiming that Medina placed the cocaine on Cano’s
truck without the knowledge or consent of Cano.38 As evidence, Cano
planned to bring evidence that showed Medina had access to the truck
because Medina had a key to the truck and Medina had recently driven
the truck across the United States-Mexico border.39 Cano also prepared
to present evidence of Medina’s past criminal convictions for possession
of cocaine, Medina’s membership in the Chico-based gang, the Latin
Kings, and the Latin Kings’ system of cocaine distribution throughout
the United States and across the United States-Mexico border.40
To gather more evidence to aid in the establishment of the defense,
Cano requested that the district court order the Homeland Security Inves-
tigations (HSI), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) to turn over information that shows Me-
dina’s involvement in drug trafficking and the presence of the Latin King
gang in Southern California.41 The government argued that Cano was not
entitled to information from the FBI and DEA because the information
sought was not sufficiently important to Cano’s case and these federal
agencies were not involved in the matter.42 The district court approved
Cano’s request, noting that the HSI can facilitate the dissemination of
information from the two federal agencies to Cano.43 Cano received Me-
33 Id. at 1008-09.









43 Id. at 1009-10.
4
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol50/iss1/8
2020] United States v. Cano 53
dina’s immigration file and Bureau of Prisons records from the HSI.44
The prosecutor requested access to information from the FBI and DEA.45
Both agencies denied the prosecutor’s request.46 The lower court, in re-
considering Cano’s motion to receive information from the FBI and
DEA, held that the prosecutor did not have an obligation to turn over this
information because the prosecutor did not have access to potential evi-
dence in the possession of the two federal departments.47
The government offered Medina immunity from criminal charges
and immigration to the United States in exchange for his cooperation
regarding the drug importation scheme.48 Initially, Medina denied in-
volvement in any drug-related matters, but he later indicated that he
would cooperate with the government’s efforts because he could assist
the government in stopping organized criminal activity on a large scale.49
The information conveyed between Medina and the government was
available to Cano.50
At Cano’s trial, the government presented the evidence gathered
from Cano’s cell phone by agents Petonak and Medrano.51 Cano
presented a defense in which he implicated his cousin, Jose Medina.52
The first trial resulted in a mistrial because there was a hung jury.53
However, Cano was convicted at the retrial.54
II. ANALYSIS
Cano appealed to the  Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, claiming that
the evidence obtained from his cell phone should have been suppressed
at trial because the warrantless search violated Cano’s rights under the
Fourth Amendment, the prosecutor’s failure to disclose materials from
the FBI and DEA violated due process, and the government engaged in
prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument.55 Ultimately, the
Ninth Circuit held that the evidence obtained from the warrantless search
of Cano’s cell phone should have been suppressed at trial but the govern-
ment did not violate due process by failing to deliver documents from the








52 Id. at 1009–10.
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FBI and DEA.56 The court did not address the question of prosecutorial
misconduct.57 Based on these findings, the court reversed the district
court’s order denying Cano’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from
the warrantless searches of his cell phone and vacated Cano’s
conviction.58
A. THE LOWER COURT ERRED BY PERMITTING EVIDENCE OBTAINED
FROM CANO’S CELL PHONE IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO BE ADMITTED AT TRIAL
The Ninth Circuit began by quoting the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution which states that it is “‘[t]he right of the peo-
ple to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against un-
reasonable searches and seizures.’”59 Interpreting this passage and
binding precedent, the court explained a search is presumed to be in vio-
lation of the Fourth Amendment unless a judicial officer issues a warrant,
based on probable cause, that describes the location of the search.60
However, there are certain searches that can be conducted without a war-
rant, such as searches that occur at the border that promote the nation’s
interest in “‘examining persons and property crossing into this
country.’”61
A warrantless search conducted at the border must be conducted to
enforce importation laws by seizing “‘merchandise which . . . shall have
been introduced into the United States in any manner contrary to law.’”62
A warrantless search at the border cannot be used to generally enforce
law.63 Warrantless, forensic searches of cell phones may only be con-
ducted by a border agent if the agent had reasonable suspicion that the
individual possessed contraband.64 On appeal, Cano claimed that the
warrantless, forensic search of his cell phone at the border violated the
Fourth Amendment.65
Although Cano argued that all searches of cell phones at the border
violate the Fourth Amendment because the searches are not used to en-
force importation laws since cell phones cannot contain contraband, the
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 1026.
59 Id. at 1010 (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV).
60 Id.
61 Id. at 1011–12 (quoting U.S. v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 960 (9th Cir. 2013)).
62 Id. at 1013 (quoting U.S. v. Soto-Soto, 598 F.2d 545, 548-59 (9th Cir. 1979)).
63 Id.
64 Id. at 1012 (citing U.S. v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537-51 (1985)).
65 Id.
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Ninth Circuit disagreed.66 Reasoning that contraband can be stored on
cell phones in digital form, such as child pornography, the court held that
searches of cell phones at the border can be conducted to enforce impor-
tation laws.67
However, the Ninth Circuit agreed with Cano’s second argument,
holding that this specific cell phone search violated the Fourth Amend-
ment because the agents acted to prevent future crimes rather than to
enforce importation laws by seizing contraband.68 Cano argued that the
search was not limited to a search for contraband because the agents
searched Cano’s call log and text messages in order to find investigative
leads and evidence related to future criminal activity.69 The court held
that border searches must be limited to searches designed to enforce im-
portation laws, such as seizing contraband.70 The court acknowledged
the difference between contraband and evidence, offering several exam-
ples.71 For example, child pornography would constitute both contraband
and evidence because it is illegal to possess such material, deeming the
photos contraband, and also proof of a crime, deeming the photos evi-
dence.72 On the other hand, emails on a cell phone are not contraband
because it is not outright illegal to possess emails, but the same emails
could be used as evidence to prove a price-fixing case.73 Here, the court
held that the search of Cano’s cell phone, namely the call logs and text
messages, violated the Fourth Amendment because the officers searched
for evidence of a future crime rather than contraband.74
Third, the court rejected Cano’s argument, supported by an amicus
brief filed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, that forensic searches
of cell phones must be supported by probable cause rather than reasona-
ble suspicion because cell phones contain intimate details of individu-
als.75 Probable cause is a heightened standard of suspicion, which would
only allow an officer to conduct the search if the officer believed, based
on the evidence, that the individual committed or will commit a crime.76
However, in Cotterman, the court previously held that electronic devices,
specifically laptops, can be forensically searched so long as the officer
had reasonable suspicion that the individual may have committed or will
66 Id. at 1013–14.
67 Id. at 1014.
68 Id. at 1018–19.
69 Id. at 1026.





75 Id. at 1014–1015.
76 Probable Cause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2nd ed. 1910).
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commit a crime.77 The court rejected Cano and EFF’s proposal to adopt
the heightened standard of probable cause because precedent in Cotter-
man allows for forensic searches at the border of electronic devices, now
including cell phones, to be based on reasonable suspicion.78
However, the court agreed with Cano that the search violated the
Fourth Amendment because the forensic search of Cano’s cell phone was
not supported by reasonable suspicion that the cell phone contained con-
traband.79 The court articulated that, while a manual search of a cell
phone can be conducted without suspicion, a forensic search - which is
more intrusive into the privacy of the individual - of a cell phone must be
supported by reasonable suspicion that the individual possessed contra-
band.80 In Cano’s case, the court stated that the initial, manual search of
Cano’s cell phone was justified as this search did not require heightened
suspicion.81 However, because the officers did not have reasonable sus-
picion that the cell phone contained contraband, the forensic search using
the Cellebrite software violated the Fourth Amendment.82
The court held that contraband can take digital form, warrantless
border searches must be limited to searches for contraband, and forensic
searches must be justified by reasonable suspicion.83 Because the second
search of Cano’s cell phone was a search for evidence of a future crime
rather than contraband, and the forensic search was not based on reasona-
ble suspicion that the cell phone contained contraband, the search of
Cano’s cell phone violated the Fourth Amendment.84 The lower court
erred by allowing evidence found on Cano’s cell phone to be admitted at
trial.85
B. THE LOWER COURT ERRED BY PERMITTING ILLEGALLY OBTAINED
EVIDENCE TO BE ADMITTED AT TRIAL BECAUSE THE
OFFICERS DID NOT SEARCH CANO IN RELIANCE
ON BINDING JUDICIAL PRECEDENT
Generally, the exclusionary rule prohibits the use of illegally ob-
tained evidence at trial.86 However, evidence obtained from an illegal
search can be introduced at trial as an exception to the exclusionary rule
77 Cano, 934 F.3d at 1014–15.
78 Id. at 1016.
79 Id. at 1021.
80 Id. at 1019-20.
81 Id. at 1019.
82 Id. at 1021.
83 Id. at 1014.
84 Id. at 1019.
85 Exclusionary Rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2nd ed. 1910).
86 Cano, 934 F.3d at 1021.
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“‘when [a government official] conduct[s] a search in objectively reason-
able reliance on binding judicial precedent.’”87 The court emphasized
that the government official must be acting in good faith on binding ap-
pellate precedent that “‘specifically authorizes’” the conduct to obtain
the evidence; it is not sufficient for a government actor to rely on case
law that is “‘unclear.’”88
The court found that the evidence obtained from the unlawful search
of Cano’s cell phone should not have been introduced at trial pursuant to
the exclusionary rule because the officers did not act in reliance on bind-
ing judicial precedent.89 The government argued that Petonak and
Medrano acted in reliance on the binding judicial precedent in Cotterman
to conduct the search of Cano’s cell phone.90 The court stated that Cot-
terman was not binding precedent on this case because Cotterman per-
mitted searches for contraband; Cotterman did not permit searches for
evidence of future crimes.91 The court further explained that “[s]earching
for evidence and searching for contraband are not the same thing.”92 Ul-
timately, the court found that the exclusionary rule barred the introduc-
tion of evidence obtained from the unlawful search of Cano’s cell phone
because there was no precedent that permitted agent Petonak and
Medrano’s search for evidence of a future crime.93
C. THE PROSECUTOR DID NOT VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
BY FAILING TO DELIVER DOCUMENTS HELD BY OTHER
FEDERAL AGENCIES
Cano argued that the prosecutor violated the Due Process Clause by
withholding information from the FBI and DEA.94 The court held that
the prosecutor did not violate the Due Process Clause because the prose-
cutor did not have access to FBI and DEA documents.95
87 Id. (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 239 (1976)).
88 Id. (quoting U.S. v. Lara, 815 F.3d 605, 613-14 (9th Cir. 2016)).
89 Id. at 1021-22.
90 Id. at 1021.
91 Id. at 1022.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 1021-22.
94 Id. at 1025.
95 Id. at 1026.
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D. THE COURT DID NOT ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT
On appeal, Cano claimed that the prosecutor committed
prosecutorial misconduct.96 Because the court vacated Cano’s conviction
based on the introduction of illegally obtained evidence at trial, the court
did not address this issue.97
III. IMPLICATIONS
The Ninth Circuit’s conclusions in Cano are in conflict with United
States v. Kolsuz, a decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit.98 In Kolsuz, two federal agents received a tip that Kolsuz
was known to smuggle firearms and would soon be traveling through the
Washington Dulles International Airport.99 Based on this information,
the agents conducted a warrantless, forensic search of Kolsuz’s cell
phone.100 Although the agents did not have cause to believe that Kolsuz
was currently smuggling firearms, the Fourth Circuit ratified the agents’
conduct by stating that the warrantless, forensic search was justified by
“the prevention and disruption of ongoing efforts to export contraband
illegally.”101 The broad language in Kolsuz allows the government to
conduct warrantless, forensic searches of cell phones at the border so
long as the individual poses a threat to enforcement efforts; the govern-
ment does not need to have belief that the individual is currently commit-
ting a crime to conduct the intrusive search.102 The Fourth Circuit’s
holding is in direct conflict with the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Cano,
which states that warrantless, forensic searches of cell phones at the bor-
der must be supported by a particularized suspicion that the individual is
currently engaged in a violation of importation laws.103
Because the rulings of the Ninth Circuit and the Fourth Circuit are in
conflict, this issue of whether the government can conduct a warrantless,
forensic search of a cell phone at the border is prime for review by the
Supreme Court.
96 Id. at 1010.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 1017.
99 U.S. v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 138 (4th Cir. 2018).
100 Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 139.
101 Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 143–44.
102 Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 143–44.
103 Cano, 934 F.3d at 1017.
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CONCLUSION
For the many people traveling across the United States border with a
cell phone containing large amounts of personal information, there will
be uncertainty as to what prerequisites must be satisfied before a federal
agent can conduct a warrantless, forensic search of a person’s cell phone.
Until the judiciary provides clarity on this point, travelers should be
ware.
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